Although the ever-present hedgerows of the Norman terrain had appeared on aerial maps, their actual structure was a shock to Allied troops. From the air, Normandy resembled a green quilt of odd-shaped fields outlined by bushy hedgerows that appeared to be nothing more than thin belts of trees and shrubbery. When the troops got a firsthand look, they discovered something completely unexpected: solid earthen dikes beneath the overgrown shrubbery.
Often, the hedgerows arched over the sunken dirt pathways, forming leafy tunnels through which light seldom shown. Wherever a soldier stood, his view was blocked in all directions by walls of vegetation. Baffled units commonly found themselves lost in adjacent fields for hours before discovering the presence of others.
Often four feet high, three feet thick, and knotted with root systems, digging into the hedgerows was slow, backbreaking work for the Allied troops. Not only did the terrain impede the progress of the invaders, it provided an ideal fortress for the defenders by shielding them from small arms fire. Troops behind a hedgerow were practically invisible and could move quickly from position to position, giving the impression that the force was larger than its actual number.
Long before the beach invasions, the Germans were fully aware of the defensive benefits of the hedgerows and were prepared to take advantage of the terrain during combat. The invasion team's saving grace was their remarkably detailed aerial photographs of Normandy that marked the position of every hedgerow and lane, displaying terrain contours with amazing accuracy. Special stereoscopic magnifying glasses enabled Allied artillery men to carefully scrutinize the photos for targets.
The Germans had second-rate maps and limited photographs; they preferred captured Allied maps to their own. But their troops had trained in Normandy for six months prior to the landings and did not need to rely on maps as much as the Allies. (1)
General Omar Bradley, commander of United States ground forces, had this to say about confronting hedgerows: "Across the neck of the Normandy peninsula, the hedgerows formed a natural line of defense more formidable than even Rommel could have contrived . . . . The tiny pastures . . . were backed by deep drainage ditches and these the enemy utilized as a built-in system of communication trenches. To advance from pasture to pasture it became necessary for us to break a path through these ramparts in the face of savage and well-concealed enemy fire. Not even in Tunisia had we found more exasperating defensive terrain." (2)
Tanks tended to belly up on the banks of the hedgerows, leaving them vulnerable to attack. Tanks traveling on narrow roads lined by hedgerows were often confronted by deadly 88 mm cannons coming around a bend in the road. The Germans had also thoroughly prepared the hedgerows with rifle pits and tunneled openings for machine-gun positions. This protected them from mortar and artillery fire. Only by using mortars fired by heavy-weapons companies could the Allies advance with fire-and-movement tactics. (3)
Allied forces fought their way inland, field by field, surrounded by hedgerows. Fatigue and morale worsened through days of cold drizzling rains. A boost to morale came from an inspired solution to the impenetrable hedgerows: a U.S. sergeant devised pointed steel blades to weld to the fronts of tanks that allowed them to plow through hedgerows with much less difficulty. With the help of these "bulldozer" tanks, and in spite of the hardships, by mid-June the Allies were poised for their major offensive that would free Cherbourg and Caen from enemy occupation.
_________________________
1. Joseph Balkoski, "Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy," (Harrisburg, Stackpole Books, 1989), p. 159-161.
2. John Colby, "War From the Ground Up: The 90th Division in WWII," (Austin: Nortex Press, 1991), p. 37.
